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This paper provides an alternative way of linking Honneth’s 
claims on critical theory with his view of education. It 
addresses the question whether Honneth’s view of education 
bear the ramifications of his early theory of recognition, and 
how it does come into play in the current strand of his thought 
in his later works. Honneth’s own description of doing critical 
theory is then appropriated to education in the phrase “critical 
pedagogy with normative content.” The development of 
Honneth’s thought from his theory of recognition to his notion 
of social freedom is first mapped out which provides the 
foundation for the discussion of the moral-practical 
dimension of education in the second part. The last part 
surveys the normative goals of critical pedagogy in praxis 
from Honneth’s own experience as an educator and critical 
theorist, from methods employed by other researchers who 
employed Honneth’s theory as well as from local practices of 
social critique.    
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 The appropriation of critical theory is described by 
Paolo Bolaños as congruent to a more practical approach in 
the study of philosophy. He admonishes “a shift from a purely 
speculative-metaphysical stance to a theoretico-materialist-
practical stance” in doing philosophy that is “sensitive to 
social realities from within and not from without.”1 This 
practicality is grounded on critical theory’s socio-political 
approach to reality, becoming then “an appropriate 
theoretico-diagnostic tool in appraising social pathologies”2 
that facilitate social emancipation from injustices and 
bondage. Bolaños particularly cites Axel Honneth’s ethics of 
recognition as an “alternative language”3 to philosophical 
understanding in its flight from essentialism to normativity4 
— the anthropologically and institutionally constitutive 
standard practices of human persons.  
Launching from Bolaños’ platform, this paper extends 
his appraisal of Honneth’s social theory into education which, 
for this author, is a most viable move to effect emancipation. 
                                                 
1 Paolo A. Bolaños, “The Ethics of Recognition and the Normativity of 
Social Relations: Some Notes on Axel Honneth’s Materialist Philosophical 
Anthropology,” in SURI: The Official Journal of the Philosophical Association of 
the Philippines, 1:1 (2012), 24. 
2 Paolo A. Bolaños, “What is Critical Theory?” Max Horkeimer and the 
Makings of the Frankfurt School Tradition” in Mabini Review: An 
Interdisciplinary Journal of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, 2:1 
(2013), 17. 
3 Bolaños, “The Ethics of Recognition and the Normativity of Social 
Relations: Some Notes on Axel Honneth’s Materialist Philosophical 
Anthropology,” 24. 
4 Nonetheless, in his paper “The Ethics of Recognition and the 
Normativity of Social Relations: Some Notes on Axel Honneth’s Materialist 
Philosophical Anthropology,” Bolaños dwells only within Honneth’s earlier 
works namely The Struggle for Recognition, Disrespect and Redistribution or 
Recognition: A Political-Philosohical Exchange. 
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This is based on the claim that for Honneth, “education and the 
school system are considered to be a social precondition of 
democracy.”5 In his later works, Honneth puts premium on the 
notion of social freedom which he perceives to culminate in 
the idea of a “democratic ethical life” or, in what he recently 
called, a “renewed socialism.” This paper provides an 
alternative way of linking Honneth’s claims on critical theory 
with his view of education which has only recently come into 
print in the essay “Education and the Democratic Public 
Sphere: A Neglected Chapter of Political Philosophy”6 where 
he traces the decoupling of democratic theory and 
pedagogical practice then, reconstructs the project of 
democratic education. This addresses the question whether 
Honneth’s view of education bear the ramifications of his 
early theory of recognition, and how it does come into play in 
the current strand of his thought in his later works. The paper 
proposes to appropriate Honneth’s own description of doing 
critical theory to education in the phrase “critical pedagogy 
with normative content.” 
To substantiate what this means, the paper first traces 
the development of Honneth’s thought from his theory of 
recognition to what he now dubs as a theory of social freedom. 
This will constitute the first part where the basic claims of 
recognition as an ontological ground, disrespect as normative 
basis of social critique and his concept of social freedom are 
presented. In Freedom’s Right (2014), the idea of a 
“democratic ethical life” is something achieved only through 
the confluence of the forms of social freedom which Honneth 
further develops in his renewal of the original idea of 
socialism in the book The Idea of Socialism (2017). Socialism 
redefined would be the consummation of social freedom 
realized within the institutionalized recognitive spheres. All 
these will provide the framework for what can already be 
                                                 
5 Odin Lysaker and Jonas Jakobsen, “Introduction” in Recognition and 
Freedom Axel Honneth’s Political Thought (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 14. 
6 Axel Honneth, “Education and the Democratic Public Sphere: A 
Neglected Chapter of Political Philosophy” in Recognition and Freedom Axel 
Honneth’s Political Thought, 17-32. 
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construed as a “critical pedagogy with normative content” in 
the second part of the paper. The moral-practical base of 
education situates pedagogy within the theoretical matrix of 
recognition where its basic critical components are extracted. 
Then, social freedom is established as the normative-practical 
goal of critical pedagogy steered along a holistic trajectory by 
taking renewed socialism as its theoretical resource for 
praxis. This will allow education to appear as both a strategic 
locus for the praxis of democracy and the instrument through 
which democracy becomes a normative political culture. The 
last part surveys the normative goals of critical pedagogy in 
praxis within Honneth’s own experience as an educator and 
critical theorist. Methods employed by other researchers who 
employed Honneth’s theory as well as local practices of social 
critique will also be consolidated as possible “pathways” 
through which the emancipative goal of critical pedagogy with 
normative content could be achieved. 
 
 
From Recognition to Social Freedom 
 
 Axel Honneth has consistently insisted his approach 
as a critical theorist in the Frankfurt School tradition as doing 
social theory “with moral-practical intention.”7 In line with 
critical theory’s distinctive project of resituating social 
critique into the concrete everyday human experience and the 
dislocation of the praxis of emancipation from a single class 
revolution,8 Honneth finds in the struggle for recognition that 
he retrieves from Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, “the 
                                                 
7 Gonçalo, Marcelo, “Recognition and Critical Theory Today: An 
Interview with Axel Honneth” in Philosophy and Social Criticism. 39:2 (January 
2013), 213. 
8 Bolaños summarizes the three-fold assumptions of Frankfurt School 
Critical Theory into “(1) the anthropological turn, (2) emancipation from slavery 
and the abolition of social injustice, (3) and the shift from a class-based critique 
to a kind of social critique that goes beyond any social class.” Bolaños, “What is 
Critical Theory? Max Horkeimer and the Makings of the Frankfurt School 
Tradition,” 6. 
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foundations for a social theory with normative content.”9 This 
he worked out in his signature book The Struggle for 
Recognition where he was able to come up with an empirically 
based human phylogeny and ontogeny through a 
reinterpretation of Hegel’s early writings in Jena via George 
Herbert Mead’s social psychology. Recognition in other words 
is, borrowing Heikki Ikaheimo’s term, the “ontological”10 
foundation for the identity formation of persons. Honneth also 
finds in the struggle for recognition the normative basis for 
social critique — namely, the individual’s experience of 
disrespect. From Hegel, Honneth asserts “first, that successful 
ego-development presupposes a certain sequence of forms of 
reciprocal recognition and, second, that subjects are informed 
of the absence of this recognition by experiencing disrespect 
in such a way that they see themselves obliged to engage in a 
' struggle for recognition'.”11 
 Briefly, there are three spheres of recognition 
generally experienced that contribute to the progress of moral 
autonomy. First is care or love wherein according to Honneth, 
Hegel first employs the term recognition to refer to the initial 
experience of knowing oneself-in-the-other within the 
intimate familial relationship.12 This recognition which 
addresses the singularity13 of a person is where one first gains 
                                                 
9 Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of 
Social Conflicts, trans. by Joel Anderson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 1. 
10 Heikki Ikaheimo explains that recognition is both an ontological and 
ethical concept. In one sense, “subjects develop into persons through 
recognition, that is, by taking, and being taken by, others as persons” … in 
another sense “the extent to which persons so recognize and are recognized 
mutually is a decisive measure with which we judge the ethical quality or 
goodness of life as persons.” Heikki Ikaheimo, “Making the Best of what We Are: 
Recognition as an Ontological and Ethical Concept” in The Philosophy of Social 
Recognition: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives” Edited by Hans-
Cristoph Schmidt am Busch and Christopher F. Zurn (Plymouth, Lexington 
Books: 2010), 346. 
11 Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of 
Social Conflicts, 69. 
12 Ibid., 37. 
13 See Renante Pilapil’s summary of the three spheres of recognition 
where he employs the term “singularity” in the first sphere to answer the 
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practical self-knowledge, trust and self-confidence crucial for 
the development of a healthy personality and is precursory to 
the next sphere of recognition. The second is respect which 
addresses the universality of the subject as a being entitled to 
equal rights with his fellowman that should be accorded by 
the legal order. And the third is the sphere of esteem which 
recognizes the subject as a particularly unique individual who 
is capable of contributing his share towards the flourishing of 
the society.  
Disrespect14 in the context of these three spheres 
would be the absence or deprivation of recognition. Honneth 
cites torture and rape as a clear example of disrespect in the 
first sphere which “does a lasting damage to one’s basic 
confidence (learned through love) that one can autonomously 
coordinate one’s own body.”15 What is destructive in this 
attempt to control a person’s body “is not the purely physical 
pain but rather the combination of this pain with the feeling of 
being defenselessly at the mercy of another subject, to the 
point of feeling that one has been deprived of reality.”16 Cases 
of disrespect in the second sphere would be instances where 
an individual is “structurally excluded from the possession of 
certain rights within a society.”17 For Honneth, the injury here 
“lies not just in the forcible restriction of personal autonomy 
but also in the combination with the feeling of not enjoying the 
status of a full-fledged partner to interaction, equally 
                                                 
question which person one is, “universalizable interests of all members of the 
society” in the second sphere, and “particularity” in the third sphere to describe 
the unique kind of person one is as member of a social group. Renante Pilapil, 
Recognition: Examining Identity Struggles (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila 
University Press, 2015), 66-84. 
14 Honneth devotes another book-length analysis of disrespect where 
he claims this to be “the systematic key to a comprehensive theory of 
recognition that attempts to clarify the sense in which institutionalized patterns 
of social recognition generate justified demands on the way subjects treat each 
other.” Axel Honneth, Disrespect: The Normative Foundation of Critical Theory, 
trans. by John Farell (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), xiii. 
15 Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, 132. 
16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid., 133. 
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endowed with moral rights.”18 On the other hand to 
downgrade certain patterns of self-realization wounds up an 
individual who has embodied that society’s cultural patterns. 
This “insult” or “cultural degradation” according to Honneth 
“typically brings with it a loss of personal self-esteem, of the 
opportunity to regard themselves as beings whose traits and 
abilities are esteemed.”19 Henceforth, as the title of the book 
itself articulates straightforwardly, disrespect for Honneth is 
the normative foundation of critical theory. 
Social critique then is geared more normatively 
towards the articulation of concrete experiences of 
misrecognition or reification20 that unlocks the emancipative 
potentials of social struggles. For Honneth, “the experience of 
disrespect is always accompanied by affective sensations that 
are, in principle, capable of revealing to individuals the fact 
that certain forms of recognition are being withheld from 
them.”21 The task is to expose these forms of misrecognition 
to pave the way for praxis towards self-realization. In another 
work, The Fragmented World of the Social (1995), Honneth 
mentions the “consciousness of injustice” as the normative 
basis for the moral claims of the “suppressed masses.”22 This 
highlights only in the socio-political level the experience of 
disrespect as the condition for the emancipative struggle for 
recognition which could be facilitated once they are rendered 
“public and forced below the threshold of political 
articulation.”23    
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 134. 
20 Honneth describes reification as “forgetfulness of recognition” in 
which he means that “in the course of our acts of cognition, we lose our 
attentiveness to the fact that this cognition owes its existence to an antecedent 
act of recognition.” Axel Honneth, Reification: A New Look at an Old Idea (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 59. 
21 Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, 136. 
22 Axel Honneth, The Fragmented World of the Social: Essays in Social 
and Political Philosophy, Edited by  Charles W. Wright (Albany: State University 
of New York, 1995),  209. 
23 Ibid., 212. 
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 In Freedom’s Right however, Honneth performs a 
methodological shift “from a philosophical-anthropological 
identity-formation to an investigation of historical-
reconstructive theory about modern freedom.”24 In this work, 
he appraises freedom as the most dominant value in the 
society today25 and as the most entwined with modern 
conceptions of justice.26 He writes that “the idea of individual 
self-determination is the normative point of reference for all 
modern conceptions of justice” so much so that “what is just is 
that which protects, fosters or realizes the autonomy of all 
members of society.”27 Honneth attempts to come up with a 
theory of justice through social analysis in response to what 
he identified as the deficit of contemporary political 
philosophy’s fixation on purely normative principles 
(decoupled from an analysis of society).28 He finds Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Right as the model for this project in assigning 
“Right” to the elements of social reality where freedom is 
institutionalized (in Hegel’s time) thereby gaining both 
substance and legitimacy. In retrospect, Hegel rationally 
demonstrated that freedom is objectively realized gradually in 
                                                 
24 Odin Lysaker and Jonas Jakobsen, “Introduction,” 3. 
25 “… of all the ethical values prevailing and competing for dominance 
in modern society, only one has been capable of leaving a truly lasting 
impression on our institutional order: freedom, i.e. the autonomy of the 
individual.” Axel Honneth, Freedom’s Right: The Social Foundations of 
Democratic Life, trans. by Joseph Ganahl (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014), 15. 
26 The shape of justice nonetheless will take form depending on the 
notion of freedom embodied in a theory..Aside from social freedom Honneth 
classifies two other models of freedom in modernity according to which justice 
may also take shape: negative and reflexive freedom. In broad strokes negative 
freedom, emphasizes “freedom from” impediments to self-realisation whose 
determination is ultimately ordained by no less than the self. “It focuses 
entirely,” Honneth writes, “on the “external liberation of action.” Ibid., 28. 
Reflexive freedom, which in turn could be initially suggested by “freedom to” 
“focuses solely on the subject’s relation-to-self” that is, “individuals are free if 
their actions are solely guided by their own intentions.” Ibid., 29. However, 
though autonomy and self-determination may already be implicit in this 
category, Honneth points out that it “stops short of the conditions that enable 
the exercise of freedom in the first place.” Ibid., 40. 
27 Ibid., 18. 
28 Ibid., 2. 
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the ethical substance (Sittlichkeit) of the family, civil society 
and the state.29 Following this mold, Honneth provides a 
scaffolding for the missing historical and institutional30 
character of the spheres of recognition in his earlier work. As 
a result, he was able to reframe the idea of justice based on the 
spheres of recognition in the society.31 
Justice corresponds to the present embodiments of 
social freedom in the institutions of personal relationships, 
market economy and democratic will-formation. This 
modified version of Hegel’s ethical life is evidently grounded 
on the spheres of care, respect and esteem which are now 
established by Honneth as institutionalized within the current 
historical facticity. There are also three forms of justice 
immanent within these institutions of recognition based on 
their respective existing normative values for self-realization. 
Personal relationships for instance represent social relations 
“whose reciprocal fulfillment allows us to experience the 
intersubjective realization of our respective individuality”32 
through the institutions of friendship, intimate relationships 
and family. The market economy on the other hand is 
normatively not a value-free system run by the invisible hand 
of supply and demand but an institution of mutual recognition 
“between economic actors who grant each other equal rights 
to maximize individual utility”33 in the spheres of 
consumption and labour market. It is an institution of social 
freedom because honour and freedom is supposed to be 
recognized in the market-mediated labor34 based on the 
normative principles of equal opportunity, improvements in 
                                                 
29 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on Natural Right and Political 
Science The First Philosophy of Right, trans. by J. Michael Stewart and Peter C. 
Hodgson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 137. 
30 These are the two corrections he says he would make if given the 
chance to revise Struggle for Recognition. Marcelo, “Recognition and Critical 
Theory Today: An Interview with Axel Honneth,” 210-211. 
31 Honneth, Freedom’s Right: The Social Foundations of Democratic Life,  
vii. 
32 Ibid., 134. 
33 Ibid., 192. 
34 Ibid., 223. 
108     Victor John M. Loquias 
 
the workplace and co-determination.”35 Finally, the sphere of 
democratic deliberation and will-formation is an embodiment 
of freedom referring to “the institution of the democratic 
‘public’ or ‘public sphere’, a social space in which citizens form 
generally acceptable beliefs through deliberative discussion, 
beliefs that form the principles to be obeyed by the legislature 
in accordance with the rule of law.”36  
Justice therefore consists not in the determination of 
what is due based on an externally imposed principle 
detached from the given social reality but rather on the 
determination of the legitimacy of values in the given 
institutions of recognition or, in Honneth’s own words, in 
“judging individual questions of legitimacy.”37 What makes 
personal relationships just is that it is the institutionalization 
of love where individual ego identity takes shape. Injustices in 
this sphere would be those which hamper the formation of 
relationships or wound up such relationships of love like in 
cases of physical or psychological torture and discrimination 
of same sex-relationships. What makes the market economy 
just is the institutionalization of respect as accorded and 
protected by laws to the work of individuals. Injustices would 
be brought about by insufficient compensation to labor 
weighed under the principle of achievement and the reduction 
of work to the pure scale of capital. Finally what makes 
democratic public sphere immanently just is the 
empowerment accorded to individuals when they are 
esteemed as being capable to participate in social building 
through deliberation and will-formation. The opposite of 
which is humiliation and social exclusion, or acts against 
solidarity. Overall, for Honneth “justice must entail granting 
all members of society the opportunity to participate in 
institutions of recognition.”38 Social freedom and social justice 
therefore signifies the confluence of these institutions of 
recognition which Honneth construes as the substance of a 
                                                 
35 Ibid., 252 
36 Ibid., 254 
37 Ibid., 58. 
38 Ibid., 61. 
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“democratic ethical life.” This is where Honneth performs his 
reconstruction of socialism as a theoretical source of 
orientation for praxis.  
In The Idea of Socialism Honneth attempts to steer the 
theses in his earlier work Freedom’s Right into a more 
practical aim of “transforming the social order.”39 Honneth 
clarifies nonetheless that his normative reconstruction of 
socialism is less concerned with the strategic question of how 
socialism could influence current political events than with 
the purpose “to make it once again a source of political-ethical 
orientations.”40 The emergence of the original idea of 
socialism in Honneth’s account comes already as a form of 
critique: Firstly, the way the term was first introduced to 
philosophical discourse in the second half of the eighteenth 
century  came as a call for a more humanly based legislation41; 
Secondly, socialism, as a term that referred already to “a 
movement towards the future”42 sought to reconcile the 
values of freedom, equality and fraternity inspired by the 
French Revolution in order to resist the alienating capitalist 
market expansion and  “make the existing society more ‘social’ 
by establishing collective organizations.”43 Honneth opines 
                                                 
39 Axel Honneth, The Idea of Socialism: Towards a Renewal, trans. by 
Joseph Ganahl (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017), viii. 
40 Ibid., 5. It is also worth remembering that Honneth differentiates 
Critical theory from the direct political involvement of a theory.  The former is 
a task carried out by a theoretician “to give the best possible interpretations of 
already institutionalized spheres of recognition in terms of moral progress.”  
The latter on the other hand is “to invoke the theory in a political manner” 
which is then performed by an individual as a citizen. Marcelo, “Recognition and 
Critical Theory Today: An Interview with Axel Honneth,” 214. 
41 “The term “socialism” was introduced much earlier to philosophical 
discourse when, in the second half of the eighteenth century, Catholic 
theologians sought to expose the German theory of ‘natural law’ as a dangerous 
misconception. At this time, the term ‘socialistae’ (a neologism derived from 
the Latin ‘socialis’) referred to a tendency in the works of Grotius and Pufendorf, 
who were accused of claiming that the legal order of society should be founded 
on the human need for ‘sociality’ rather than divine revelation.” Honneth, The 
Idea of Socialism, 6. 
42 Ibid., 7. 
43 Ibid. 
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that the early group of socialists namely Robert Owen and his 
followers, the Saint-Simonists and the Fourierists as well as 
the second wave of socialists comprised of Louis Blanc and 
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon unanimously identified the idea of 
freedom being instilled by industrialist capitalism as 
contradictory to the values of equality and fraternity in as 
much as it only placed premium on self-aggrandizement and 
profit accumulation. Operating solely on the law of supply and 
demand, the capitalist market slipped out of the control of the 
wider social will which resulted into the concentration of 
economic power to the landowners and private factory 
owners while leaving the majority of the working population 
in impoverished and unjust conditions.44  As an act of 
resistance to the expansion of industrialist capitalism, the 
 
Early socialists demanded that the economic sphere 
be subjected to social directives not only in order to 
fend off the evils of a merely partial moralization of 
society, one that stops short of the threshold of the 
economy, nor merely ensure a more just 
distribution of resources by means of a new 
economic order, but rather to ensure that 
production serve the moral purpose of stripping 
liberty proclaimed by the French Revolution of its 
merely private and self-interested character.45 
 
As an immanent critique of the capitalist order, 
socialism sought to redefine freedom as a form of free 
cooperation among equally free subjects thereby re-
establishing the harmony between the three normative values 
of the French Revolution. It was Karl Marx however who 
rendered more conceptually the synthesis between the 
seeming contradictory features of liberty and solidarity. In 
Honneth’s interpretation, Marx understood needs as 
something mutually recognized between persons so that 
when they work, they don’t only work with each other but 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 8-10.  
45 Ibid., 13  
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most importantly for each other as well. This guarantees that 
their work as members of the society is indeed free from 
coercion and is intersubjectively shared.46 Honneth explains 
that the original idea of socialism was never solely concerned 
with distributive justice but is essentially based on a 
communitarian form of life. This entails that the satisfaction of 
individual needs and realization of individual freedoms 
actually depend upon intersubjective relations of mutual 
reciprocity. True liberty cannot be achieved alone but in 
“mutual sympathy found only in communities of solidarity.”47 
What Honneth refers to as social freedom in the preceding 
considerations is the consummation of the original socialist 
revolution where all three principles of liberty, equality and 
fraternity have been harmonized.   
 The failure of early socialism however and its eventual 
decline to spark social action was traced by Honneth in the 
socio-theoretical horizon within which the early socialists 
developed and tried to carry out their shared notion of social 
freedom. There are three assumptions identified by Honneth: 
“the economic sphere as the locus of the struggle over the 
appropriate form of freedom; the reflexive attachment to an 
already present oppositional movement; and, finally, the 
historical-philosophical expectation of the inevitable victory 
of the movement.”48 The first one reduces the revolutionary 
energy into the sphere of the economic system within the 
conceptual background that alienated labor alone calls for 
emancipation in as much as work itself alone is freedom’s 
objectification. Thus it is linked to the second assumption that 
the most affected sector of injustices would then be the major 
player to facilitate the revolution, in this case the proletariat 
as the already existing “oppositional group” who only needs 
to be educated and to be enlightened of their plight. 
Consistently shared by all socialists furthermore is the belief 
in the historical necessity of the downfall of capitalism: that 
“the capitalist market will either be destroyed by the crisis it 
                                                 
46 Ibid., 23 
47 Ibid., 27.  
48 Ibid., 32. 
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creates, unleash economic forces of collectivization, or 
produce ever stronger resistance as a result of 
impoverishment.”49  
 According to Honneth, the socialists failed to see the 
other facets through which freedom assumes other forms 
such as the sphere of political deliberation. The confinement 
of freedom to social labor shows the ties of early socialism to 
the spirit of industrial capitalism which it was hardly able to 
distance itself from. This prevented them from exploring and 
“experimenting” on other avenues through which social 
freedom could be achieved. Honneth sides with John Dewey’s 
criticism of traditional socialism of “being incapable of taking 
up an experimental stance towards historical processes of 
transformation”50 on the simply logical point that “if the 
capitalist social transformation will certainly be followed by a 
socialist order, then there will no longer be any need to 
explore already existing potentials and find out which 
measures are most appropriate for attaining the desired 
information.”51 At this point in his reconstruction of socialism, 
Honneth introduces two pathways of renewal towards which 
the promise of social freedom could be reoriented: First is a 
view of history that avoids the pitfalls of historical necessity 
upheld by the antiquated socialism, labeled as “historical 
experimentalism”; second is the idea of a democratic form of 
life which amplifies, in renewed socialism, the notion of social 
freedom that Honneth has already worked out in Freedom’s 
Right. 
 Honneth draws from John Dewey the articulation of 
his perspective on historical experimentation which in closer 
analysis rehearses some of his even earlier standpoints on the 
normative foundations of critical theory. History is not fixedly 
oriented on a single course but is filled with potentialities 
waiting to be unleashed when the barriers to communication 
between members of the society are removed so that 
                                                 
49 Ibid., 30 . 
50 Ibid., 59 
51 Ibid.  
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everyone affected can take part in the social will formation.52 
Taking this normative guideline which Dewey accords to 
finding the most comprehensive answer to problematic 
situations through social inclusion ensures that problems are 
articulated well and the most intelligent and best solutions are 
come up with by the members themselves in the process of 
free interaction.53 This entails however an ear and sensitivity 
to the voice of the isolated and excluded individuals who 
struggle for the recognition of their identities and outcry 
experiences of injustices which may have been caused, 
whether intentionally and indirectly or otherwise, by non-
representation or misrepresentation in the society as a whole. 
For Honneth experimentalism is the methodological path 
which could be taken as history unfolds so that potentials for 
solving social problems will grow and improvements in the 
society are established more cooperatively. Initially therefore, 
in a renewed fashion, Honneth now suggests that: 
 
Socialism must be viewed as the specific modern 
articulation of the fact that in the course of history 
and on the basis of varying social circumstances, 
new groups constantly seek to draw public 
attention to their own demands by attempting to 
tear down barriers to communication and thereby 
expand the space of social freedom. Such a 
“struggle” certainly characterizes the entirety of 
human history and continues even today; after all, 
in the course of the expansion of social interaction 
and the increase of political connections, new 
collectives are repeatedly faced with a lack of 
recognition for their concerns. In each case, the only 
possibility for attaining such recognition is to 
invoke already implicitly accepted norms and 
                                                 
52 Ibid., 60-63. 
53 Immediately recognizable is the resemblance of this claim to 
Honneth’s notion of the collective articulation of disrespect as a requirement 
for resistance and political action as well as Honneth’s take on the specific task 
of social philosophy in the diagnosis of social pathologies. 
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thereby to demand the right to have a say in the 
formulation of social rules.54  
 
A renewed socialism therefore can no longer simply 
reduce the revolutionary initiative to a single class movement 
but has to extend it to the wider stakeholders of the society. 
Hence the democratic form of life is put to the fore as the 
characteristically fit description of socialism as it has to 
accommodate especially the marginalized members of the 
society. The economic sphere as well can no longer be the only 
locus for the realization of freedom lest other institutionalized 
forms of freedom in the current social landscape be excluded. 
As the task of the analysis of justice mentioned above consists 
in judging questions of letigimacy, socialism’s realizability, 
according to Honneth, will depend on its “capacity to bring 
about institutional reforms within the given social reality — 
reforms that point toward future change (Italics mine).”55 
However this change is not something predetermined and 
reforms will always come with an aura of tentativity. It is for 
this reason that socialism must take a reflexive stance towards 
itself in “tracing its own intentions to regain confidence in the 
realizability of its visions in the future.”56  At each every 
moment however, it is the conditions for social freedom or the 
“democratic ethical life” as stated above that must be 
prepared by emancipating the spheres of personal 
relationships, economy and democratic politics from 
coercion.57 Honneth’s identification of an emancipated society 
with the democratic form of life is evidently inscribed in his 
description: 
 
“Democracy” does not merely signify free and equal 
participation in political will-formation; understood 
as an entire way of life, it means that individuals can 
participate equally at every central point in the 
                                                 
54  Honneth, The Idea of Socialism, 65. 
55  Ibid., 74.  
56  Ibid. 
57 Ibid., 89-90. 
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mediation between the individual and society, such 
that each functionally differentiated sphere reflects 
the general structure of democratic participation.58  
 
Honneth compares the democratic society into an 
organ with differentiated parts functioning independently but 
at the same integrated into a single whole. But how to go about 
with this goal of emancipation and organic interaction among 
the three spheres, Honneth aligns himself again with Dewey 
in identifying that only through the process of unrestricted 
communication can unused potentials be unleashed. Hence 
the steering organ fit to facilitate this process would be the 
sphere of democratic action in as much as it is the arena of free 
interaction: the public sphere is “the authority within a 
functionally arranged society that should take over the task of 
integrative steering.”59 Honneth ascribes now to democracy 
both the diagnostic and therapeutic function of critical theory 
and political praxis. This is evident in his statement that “due 
to the plurality of voices and perspectives, citizens’ 
cooperation would enable them to quickly notice problems in 
individual spheres and in their interaction, thus also enabling 
a number of proposals for modifications.”60 Likewise, on the 
agency of emancipation: “The citizens assembled in the 
democratic public sphere are the only ones who can be 
convinced to tear down existing limitations and blockages 
cautiously in order to enable free cooperation in all major 
social spheres.”61  
 
The Moral-Practical Base of Education 
  
To describe education in general as having a moral-
practical dimension is to situate it within the normative 
ground of recognition through which subjects develop 
gradually their autonomy. This implies that the 
                                                 
58 Ibid., 72.  
59 Ibid., 96.  
60 Ibid., 96.  
61 Ibid., 97 . 
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anthropological and critical claims of Honneth’s social theory 
become the theoretical framework for understanding 
education itself. This has been performed already and served 
productively a number of studies and researches in 
philosophy and educational research.62 Yet, in the same way 
that Honneth’s theory of recognition has been a viable 
framework for pedagogical researches, it has also been a 
fruitful source for some critics’ evaluation and discontent of 
Honneth’s stance and treatment of education.63 This paper on 
                                                 
62 See Rauno Huttunen’s articles “Discourse and Recognition as 
Normative grounds for Radical Pedagogy: Habermasian and Honnethian Ethics 
in the Context of Education” in Studies in Philosophy and Education, 31:31 
(March 2012) 137-152, and “Critical Adult Education and the Political 
Philosophical Debate between Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth” in Educational 
Theory,  57:4 (2007) 423-433,  as well as an article co-authored with Hannu 
Heikkinen “Teaching and the Dialectic of Recognition” in Pedagogy, Culture and 
Society, 12:2 (2004) 163-174, https://doi.org/10.1080/14681360400200194; In 
the area of adult education, Ted Fleming has an article “Reclaiming the 
Emancipatory Potential of Adult Education: Honneth’s Critical theory and the 
Struggle for Recognition” in European Journal for Research on the Education and 
Learning of Adults, 7:1, (2016) 13-24, DOI 10.3384/rela.2000-7426.rela9077 
and another paper co-authored with Linden West and Fergal Finnegan 
“Connecting Bourdieu, Winnicott, and Honneth: Understanding the 
experiences of non-traditional learners through an interdisciplinary lens” in 
Studies in the Education of Adults, 45:2, (Autumn 2013). Individual papers on 
diverse topics by various authors include Alan Baindbridge’s “Pedagogy of 
Recognition: Winnicott, Honneth and Learning in Psychosocial Spaces” in 
Journal of Pedagogic Development, 5:3, 9-25; Manuel Goncalves Barbosa and 
Angel Garcia Del Dujo’s “Education and Struggles for Recognition: the Strategic 
Role of Empowerment” in Revisita Española año LXXIV, 264 (mayo-agosto 2016) 
100-200; Joaquin Gil Martinez’s “Recognition and Emotions: A Critical Approach 
on Education” in Procedia — Social and Behavioral Sciences 46 (2012) 3925-
3930; Mark Murphy’s “On Recognition and Respect: Honneth, Intersubjectivity 
and Education” in Educational Futures,  2:2 (January 2010) 3-11; Fredrik 
Sandberg and Chris Kubiak’s “Recognition of Prior Learning, Self-realisation and 
Identity within Axel Honneth’s Theory of Recognition” in Studies in Continuing 
Education, 35:3 (2013); and, Benjamin Seznick and David Schafer’s “Online 
Higher Education and Axel Honneth’s Social Freedom” in Threshold, 40:1 (2017) 
6-20. 
63 See Jenn Dumm and Robert Guay’s “Hegel and Honneth’s Theoretical 
Deficit: Education, Social Freedom and the Institutions of Modern Life” in Hegel 
Bulletin, 38:2 (2017), 293—317, doi:10.1017/hgl.2017.14;  see also Teemu 
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the other hand delineates that a critical pedagogy in 
Honneth’s treatment of education is normatively oriented 
towards the prospect of a democratic form of life that 
epitomizes social freedom. 
 In the essay “Recognition and Justice”, Honneth writes 
that “successful identity formation possesses a societal 
‘public’ side.”64 This is because individuation can only be 
rendered possible via socialization. Or in Honneth’s own 
words: “the possibility of the single subject’s realizing 
individual autonomy depends on the precondition of being 
able to develop an intact self-relationship by experiencing 
social recognition.”65 And if there’s one institution beyond the 
family where an individual is immediately exposed to the 
public it would be the school where education is a process 
experienced in a daily routine.  
Charles Bingham, who employs recognition theory in 
the analysis of education and identity formation in his book 
Schools of Recognition: Identity Politics and Classroom 
Practices (2001), begins with the claim that schools are public 
spaces where the interplay of recognition is substantially at 
work. By public space he means that “the school is a common 
place where people of diverse identities and opinions come 
together to deliberate, to negotiate, to compromise, or to 
decide on policies that will foster a common democracy that 
encourages diverse identities.”66 Basically, in the school the 
self publicly encounters others who are outside of his kin and 
builds a relationship that contributes to the formation of his 
identity through the image that results from their interaction. 
Bingham, using Charles Taylor’s metaphor, calls this form of 
                                                 
Hanhela’s “Axel Honneth’s Idea of a Drawn-out Process of Education” in 
Pedagogy, Culture and Society, 22:3 (2014), and “The Problematic challenges of 
Misrecognition for Pedagogic Action” in Educational Philosophy and Theory, 
46:1 (2014). 
64 Axel Honneth, “Recognition and Justice: Outline of A Plural Theory of 
Justice,” in Acta 
Sociologica, 47:4 (2004), 355. 
65 Ibid., 358. 
66 Charles Bingham, Schools of Recognition: Identity Politics and 
Classroom Practices (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 31. 
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recognition mirroring. “Mirrors,” he writes, “not only ‘reflect’ 
us, they constitute us. When we look at a mirror, we not only 
look to see who we already were, we also gain information 
about ourselves.”67  As a public space, the school in other 
words operates within the language of recognition.  
To describe school education as normatively 
grounded in recognition is to conversely affirm ab initio that 
the school is a site of struggles for recognition, as a place for 
identity formation through reciprocal recognition and a venue 
where misrecognition, interrupted ego-identity and suffering 
are experienced as well. Due to that normativity of school 
education, a critical approach evinces itself as a demand 
called-forth in pedagogy. It is significant and noteworthy that 
Honneth himself affirms, in the interview with Gonçalo 
Marcelo, that it was his school experience that animated what 
he would later develop in his theory. Honneth’s narrative 
reveals the personal background of some of the features of his 
thought that could be analyzed thematically:  
 
Looking back now, I think that it was in high school 
when I first became aware of what I would later 
try to explain with the help of the concept of the 
struggle for recognition. There was a certain 
upward mobility, as a whole generation was coming 
to high school for the first time. Those members of 
the working class, who for the first time came to the 
high school, felt a certain shame, due to their own 
class position, which was extremely interesting to 
notice. But I noticed that pre-theoretically, let’s say. 
It didn’t mobilize me directly. Shortly before the 
student movement, when I was still in high school, I 
was strongly opposed to such movements 
because I thought they were too radical, too 
empty in their goals. I never believed in the 
proletarian revolution. After I left high school I 
became a member of the youth organization of the 
Social Democrats in that area. This came all of a 
                                                 
67 Ibid., 34. 
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sudden, as I wasn’t very politicized before. But it 
was clearly the opening up of a kind of cultural 
struggle against my own class background. Not 
that I didn’t love my parents, but I disliked very 
strongly the empty bourgeois culture in which I 
grew up. So it was culturally that I came into politics 
(Highlights mine).68  
 
This biographical account speaks of the moral-
practical content of educational experience within the context 
of his social theory. Foremost, the gravity of the struggle for 
recognition as it occurs in the schools is obviously present in 
Honneth’s experience. Awareness of individual identities is 
gained through the recognition accorded to them by others in 
the relational fabric of the educational structure.  The 
experience of disrespect is likewise very manifest. In the same 
interview Honneth traces his sensitivity to suffering (a theme 
that runs ubiquitous in all his works) from school 
experience.69 He reveals that this awareness of disrespect and 
suffering became not only the impetus for his intellectual 
vocation but also the root of his engagements with politics. 
Obviously this is a personal background of what he writes in 
Struggle for Recognition that “the experience of disrespect 
represents the affective source of knowledge for social 
resistance and collective uprisings.”70  
In Honneth’s account of his experience further, the 
experiential background of the moral-practical content of his 
social theory has manifested early at school in his distaste for 
“too radical movements” and revolution. This somehow 
explains biographically (as highlighted above) the mode of 
critique that characterizes his method of normative 
reconstruction. This brand of critique stems from his 
intention of staying on the foothold of ordinary everyday 
experience of struggles for recognition. It is an analysis of 
                                                 
68 Marcelo, “Recognition and Critical Theory Today: An Interview with 
Axel Honneth,” 214. 
69 Ibid., 215-216. 
70 Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, 143. 
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social practices whose recognitive potentials for self-
realisation may have been reified and thus, either is in need of 
retrieval or revaluation in the light of present demands and 
circumstances. Freedom is substantially inseparable from the 
concrete materiality of the human condition, the practices that 
constitute the social fabric on which an individual finds 
himself already situated in — or in other words, in 
normativity.71  
With these consistent interweaving implications of 
Honneth’s own experiences and the claims in his theory of 
recognition, it appears that the critical ingredients of 
education with a moral-practical content would be the 
consciousness-raising articulation of struggles, diagnostic-
therapeutic critique and freedom oriented praxis.72 These 
three also follows the development of Honneth’s thought from 
recognition to social freedom described in the previous part. 
The consciousness-raising articulation of struggle is a demand 
that impinges upon pedagogy immediately from the 
description of the school as a site of struggles for recognition. 
Critical pedagogy should render the school as an avenue for 
awareness of the social dimension of experience through 
which individuals develop their identity. This entails that the 
experience of disrespect and the moral claims of individuals 
will not be suppressed but instead, spaces will be opened up 
for the articulation of their silent voices. It is incumbent upon 
                                                 
71 Ronald Theaus Pada has comprehensively shown in his book that 
normativity is an essential element of freedom in Honneth’s compendium. 
Roland Theuas Pada, Axel Honneth's Social Philosophy of Recognition: Freedom, 
Normativity, and Identity (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, 2017). 
72 This mirrors Paolo Bolaños’ description of critical theory as 
“philosophical praxis” which shows that Honneth’s critical theory remains 
aligned with the general assumptions of the Frankfurt School. Bolaños, “The 
Ethics of Recognition and the Normativity of Social Relations: Some Notes on 
Axel Honneth’s Materialist Philosophical Anthropology,” 18-20; Charles 
Bingham has a similar way of arranging Honneth’s critical theory into the three 
steps of the experience of misrecognition, articulation and social action. 
Bingham, Schools of Recognition: Identity Politics and Classroom Practices, 48-
51. 
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critical pedagogy therefore to protect the “affective 
sensations” that accompany the experience of disrespect from 
becoming reified especially within the educational institution 
itself. Honneth mentions that public education along with the 
media of the culture industry, or forums of political publicity 
become at present strategic agencies for domination in the 
form of “cultural exclusion.”73 A deficit of social awareness and 
a privatistic motivation for education is also a symptom of 
domination that is effected by the school itself in the form of 
“institutionalized individuation.”74 These instances occur 
when pedagogy is stripped of a critical approach to resist 
tendencies of oppression even within its own ground and the 
expressions of the experiences of injustices are suppressed. 
Honneth writes: 
 
Only if the means of articulation of a social 
movement are available can the experience of 
disrespect become a source of motivation for acts of 
political resistance. The developmental logic of such 
collective movements can, however, only be 
discovered via an analysis that attempts to explain 
social struggles on the basis of the dynamics of 
moral experiences.75 
 
The consciousness-raising articulation of social 
struggles in other words must be simultaneous with the 
procedure of diagnostic-therapeutic critique. It must be 
                                                 
73 “Processes of cultural exclusion are those strategies which limit the 
articulation chances of class-specific experiences of injustice by systematically 
withholding the appropriate linguistic and symbolic means for their 
expression.” Honneth, The Fragmented World of the Social, 213. 
74 “Processes of institutionalized individuation are all those strategies 
encouraged by the state or ordered by other organizations which attempt to 
counteract the danger of communicative agreement about group and class-
specific experiences of injustice by either directly requiring or providing long-
term support for individualistic action orientations. They destroy the 
communicative infrastructure which is the basis of a cooperative mobilization 
and elaboration of feelings of injustice.” Ibid., 214.  
75 Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, 139. 
122     Victor John M. Loquias 
 
clarified however that Honneth originally ascribes social 
critique to social philosophy. To appropriate social critique as 
a procedure of critical pedagogy designates to education not 
only the task of learning, knowledge production and 
dissemination, but also of “determining and discussing 
processes of social development that can be viewed as 
misdevelopments (Fehlentwicklungen), disorders or ‘social 
pathologies’.”76 Social critique is consciousness-raising in as 
much as it “can be understood as providing an instance of 
reflection (Reflexionsinstanz), within which criteria for 
successful forms of social life are discussed.”77 The use of the 
medical term “pathology” as a metaphor is meant to highlight 
the interruption that the experiences of social misrecognition 
bring about to the development of a healthy personality and 
identity of persons in the same way that sickness suspends 
physical well-being. “Diagnosis” on the other hand 
emphasizes the empirical approach of critique which could 
materially effect social emancipation hence, “therapeutic.”  
And finally, freedom oriented praxis is the normative 
goal of critical pedagogy which Honneth has already charted 
in his reconstruction of the institutions of freedom. In the 
essay on education, Honneth states more straightforwardly 
the project of emancipation which both pedagogy and political 
philosophy has originally shared in affinity. He traces this 
from Kant: 
 
Through the prudent choice of means and methods, 
which is to say, in an ‘artful’ way, both pedagogy and 
political philosophy are meant to instruct us on how 
to effect a transition from a state of ‘minority’ to a 
state of freedom: be it with regard to a whole 
people, consisting of individual subjects, or be it 
with regard to a child still subjected to the rule of 
nature within himself.78 
                                                 
76 Honneth, Disrespect: The Normative Foundation of Critical Theory, 4. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Honneth, “Education and the Democratic Public Sphere: A Neglected 
Chapter of Political Philosophy,” 17. 
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The realization and intermeshing of the 
institutionalized spheres of social recognition, as discussed in 
the first part of the paper, materializes a “democratic ethical 
life” which is the epitome of social freedom. This is 
tantamount to say that critical pedagogy must be oriented 
towards the renewed socialist agenda given that education is 
a precondition for democracy. In this vein, education is given 
a more social and practical orientation to fulfill. The advantage 
of re-orienting education within the conceptual blocks of a 
renewed socialism is that it is able to address holistically the 
differentiated needs and demands in the society. Without this 
wider normative role of education in mind, it will be perceived 
and utilized for purposes dictated by agencies motivated by 
profit and private interests as in the case of privately owned 
educational institutions bent on training students only in 
becoming efficient members of the labor force. While 
knowledge and skills training is of course a legitimate value 
catered to by the school, the deficit in its curriculum of 
addressing the other spheres of freedom would also result 
into a deficient aptitude of students in balancing engagement 
and participation beyond the labor market. Moreover, even 
the acquisition of capabilities to perform well in the market 
economy is not a guarantee for an emancipated labor in this 
sphere if individuals are not equipped with critical 
consciousness of their situation as stakeholders; they could 
simply be trained to work for mere privatistic reasons and 
without regard for social cohesion characteristic of the 
capitalist system. Honneth has earlier diagnosed capitalism as 
a misdevelopment79 in the economic sphere, and educational 
institutions would be merely reproducing docile agents of this 
pathological system unless their curriculum is not critically 
oriented. In other words in the absence of critical pedagogy 
the educational institutions themselves will become bastions 
of coercion and docility to oppression.  
On the other hand the predominance of personal 
relationships as motivations behind school education and the 
                                                 
79 Honneth, Freedom’s Right, 223-253.  
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disengagement from participation in the political will 
formation is even more socially detrimental. Honneth quotes 
Kant that public education should “foster in each pupil the 
virtues and capacities of a future citizen by sidestepping the 
danger of ‘perpetuating family defects’.”80 Without explicitly 
stating it part of Honneth’s intention in his essay on education, 
of intertwining pedagogy and political philosophy as a course 
to take for public education, is to salvage it from being 
confined only into one sphere. He drew attention to the 
privatization of education in the perception of parents who 
send their children to school which is a symptom of what 
education has become at present — decoupled from 
democracy.  Critical pedagogy on the other hand is meant to 
initiate individuals into the “we” of democratic will-formation. 
The training for citizenship in the public sphere is an 
educational task most fully called for in pedagogical 
institutions.  
The school is the strategic locus for the education of 
students in the sense of enhancing the conditions for the 
exercise of their freedoms in the three spheres. And in the 
institutional level, the school may likewise be the micro-
society for the “experimental” rehearsal of socialism in the 
sense of Honneth’s reorientation. This is launched from the 
premise that for Honneth, “socialism is a cosmopolitan 
                                                 
80 Honneth, “Education and the Democratic Public Sphere: A Neglected 
Chapter of Political Philosophy,” 25. There is a difference however in that, while 
Kant thinks moral autonomy is acquired through the independent use of one’s 
own reason mediated by pedagogy, Honneth views education in the context of 
social interaction and democracy: “Kant is still quite far away from drawing 
conclusions with regard to the proper methods and organization of school 
teaching. He is thinking of the individual male pupil who is to develop self-
esteem through the pedagogically mediated acquisition of knowledge, rather 
than of a cooperative community where each individual must be able to act as 
a recognized member in concert with all others for the purpose of joint 
decision-making. While at some points of his Pedagogy Kant senses that a 
republic has a much greater need for fostering the communicative virtues than 
it has for simply imparting knowledge, he still recoils from the consequence of 
identifying the public school first and foremost as a place where democratic 
capacities are formed. Ibid., 26. 
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undertaking.”81 Social freedom is a normative value that 
transcends the boundaries of nation-states. Yet, its realization 
depends only on subjects situated in “geographical spaces 
with enough cultural and legal commonalities to enable public 
spheres to come about at all.”82 This shows that the socialist 
project is a global undertaking within a multiculturalist 
geographical setting. For Honneth multiculturalism is one of 
the current challenges that education is faced with today.  And 
by multiculturalism, Honneth refers to the “heterogeneity of 
the population that composes the public sphere” whose 
differences emanate from culture and ethnicity. Perhaps Amy 
Gutmann, whose description of multiculturalism also relates 
it to the issue of politics and education, could render 
reinforcement in referring to it as the condition of “citizens 
with different cultural identities, often based on ethnicity, 
race, gender, or religion”83 where the issue of recognition and 
equality come to the fore. Honneth ends his essay writing that 
 
… at present we cannot even adequately imagine 
what that content (of democratic education) should 
be like fifteen or twenty years from now if fair and 
equal consideration is to be given to the cultural and 
ethnic composition of school classes. In order for 
those future pupils to grow into major participants 
in a highly heterogenous and colorfully mixed 
public sphere they will have to learn to approach 
history, literature, geography and most other 
subjects from the same sought of de-centralized 
perspective that we today are still struggling to 
gradually teach ourselves in the context of a number 
of academic disciplines.84 
                                                 
81 Honneth, The Idea of Socialism, 102.  
82 Ibid., 103.  
83 Amy Gutmann, “Introduction” in Multiculturalism: 
Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), 3. 
84 Honneth, “Education and the Democratic Public Sphere: A Neglected 
Chapter of Political Philosophy,” 32. 
126     Victor John M. Loquias 
 
 
The critics Jenn Dum and Robert Guay recently pointed 
out that Honneth did not develop the “distinctive aims and 
norms of education.”85 This deficit could be justified in the 
context of Honneth’s admission, in the above quotation, of the 
work to be done further and tasks to be identified in the face 
of current challenges on education if it is once more 
reoriented to a democratic ideal. However, a second look at 
Honneth’s path’s of renewal for socialism reveals that 
multiculturalism is precisely the social condition on which 
“social experimentalism” can be carried out if “difference” will 
be perceived as a venue for learning experiences.86 The more 
spaces of interaction are opened up to individuals and 
integrated into the society the more potentials could be 
tapped and more adequate solutions may be suggested to 
existing problems in the society.  Applied into the context of 
school education, difference among students is the condition 
for their flourishing via inclusion and participation. In the 
words of Honneth: 
 
The less a pupil is treated as an isolated subject 
meant to deliver a certain performance and the 
more he or she is approached as a member of a 
cooperative learning community the more likely the 
emergence of forms of communication that allow 
not only for playful acceptance of cultural 
differences but to positively conceive of such 
differences as opportunities for mutual 
enrichment.87 
 
                                                 
85 Dum and Guay, “Hegel and Honneth’s Theoretical Deficit: Education, 
Social Freedom and the Institutions of Modern Life,” 293—317.  
86 A similar view was already expressed by Honneth in Anders Petersen 
and Rasmus Willig, “An Interview with Axel Honneth The Role of Sociology in 
the Theory of Recognition” in European Journal of Social Theory 5:2 (2002), 271-
272. 
87 Honneth, “Education and the Democratic Public Sphere: A Neglected 
Chapter of Political Philosophy,” 31.  
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Critical pedagogy with this normative content 
towards social freedom is indeed a workable way towards 
social emancipation. Honneth’s method of normative 
reconstruction is also just fit to appropriate and integrate in 
pedagogy because schools are situated in diverse locations in 
different societies with values which its members hold dear. 
These values however have to be critically examined in the 
light of current demands. Hence what remain to be seen are 
the concrete, practical and workable means to carry out a 
critical pedagogy with normative content. 
 
 
The Normative Goals of Critical Pedagogy in Praxis 
 
In retrospect, the three characteristics of critical 
pedagogy established through Honneth’s social theory are:  
the consciousness-raising articulation of struggles, 
diagnostic-therapeutic critique and freedom oriented praxis. 
The moral-practical dimension of education requires the 
promotion of consciousness and resistance to forms of 
oppression in the society especially within the educational 
structure itself. This perspective does not confine pedagogy to 
mere utilitarian purposes such as providing and enhancing 
the capability to increase one’s economic capital but also, and 
most importantly as an initiation to a life of autonomy; ever 
since the first generation of critical theorists in the Frankfurt 
tradition, education has already been reconceived with this 
critical ingredient.88 A life of freedom nonetheless is 
inconsistent with conditions wherein coercion, docility, 
exclusion and non-participation persist. Critical pedagogy is 
the characteristic that surrounds an educational institution 
                                                 
88 Theodor Adorno for example conceives the role of education in the 
moral development of individuals enabling students acquire autonomy and the 
awareness, knowledge and resistance from oppression. See Theodor Adorno 
and Helmutt Becker, “Education for Autonomy” in Telos, 55 (Spring 1983), 103-
110; and “Education after Auschwitz” in Critical Models: Interventions and 
Catchwords, trans. by Henry W. Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2005), 191-204. 
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when it seeks to enhance those conditions for emancipation. 
Within Honneth’s critical pedagogy the three spheres of 
recognition provides holistic practical orientations for the 
enhancement of the conditions for social freedom. This part 
will now trace how critical pedagogy has been practiced by 
Honneth based on his own experience as an educator and 
researcher in the Frankfurt School of Social Research. The 
available literature on educational and philosophical research 
appropriating Honneth’s theory as well as the current local 
practices of philosophical social critique that strike 
resemblances of Honneth’s brand of critical theory shall also 
be surveyed to supplement how the normative goals of critical 
pedagogy could be further achieved.  
The interviews by Goncalo Marcelo, Anders Petersen 
and Rasmus Willig are valuable primary references for 
Honneth’s own testimonies which may be read in comparison 
with his thematic treatment of pedagogy in the essay on 
education. What can be gleaned from the practices and 
suggestions by Honneth in these texts is the intertwining of 
the therapeutic-diagnostic approach of critical pedagogy with 
the methodological procedure of democracy which Honneth 
has described extensively in his renewal of socialism. In the 
interview with Marcelo, Honneth says: 
 
As the director of the Institute for Social Research, I 
always try to influence the public, which means in 
Frankfurt that those who come first are not only the 
students but ordinary citizens. So what we are doing 
is having regular discussions, debates and lectures 
in the city, not in the university. We are going out to 
other places like libraries and theaters in the city, 
and we present either debates or studies on several 
topics, such as aspects of today’s crisis. That’s one 
way I try to connect theory with the social 
environment. There are other activities, too. I try to 
influence publishers to undertake some 
translations. I try to organize series of books. As an 
editorial member of a few journals, I try to 
encourage the right topics in those journals, and so 
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on. As intellectuals, we are playing all these roles at 
once, and I think we have to play them. We have to 
take very seriously the fact that sometimes you are 
working at your desk, but that many times you are 
working for the public, too. You should always try to 
build bridges toward the public and find the right 
ways to inform and to inspire the public and the 
public debate. These are the instruments I am now 
using to promote the commitment of Critical Theory 
to the public.89  
 
It is obvious here that an active engagement with social 
issues rather than simply being confined to the academic 
setting of teaching is a substantial characteristic of a critical 
pedagogy. The content of research must be those that come 
from social reality itself — problems and crises which are 
experienced and needs to be addressed. In this particular case 
of Honneth’s testimony, an example is being set to educators 
and researchers who should carry out supposedly the aims of 
social freedom. While the immediate recipients of the labor of 
teachers and researchers are the students, the wider 
beneficiary of their work is actually the entire public which 
Honneth admonishes them to recognize within their purview. 
This is a reminder that an educational profession is not merely 
a private employment one has for his “bread and butter” but a 
work that serves the entire public. It is evident as well that 
Honneth perceives the instrumental function of education in 
the formation and citizenship to the public sphere.  
At present it is the media that holds the leverage and 
power to influence the public on certain issues but 
unfortunately, the media has been proven to be utilized for 
private interests and have been weaponized for the 
maintenance of the influence of interested parties. In 
Freedom’s Right Honneth traced that the initial formation of 
the public sphere was facilitated by the early forms of media 
such as newspapers, radio and television. The reification of 
                                                 
89 Marcelo, “Recognition and Critical Theory Today: An Interview with 
Axel Honneth,” 220.  
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the media however began when it became an instrument of 
capitalism primarily for advertisement and efficient tool for 
the proliferation of the culture industry in Max Horkheimer 
and Theodor Adorno’s term. Critical pedagogy’s task is to 
resist this utilization of the media by establishing avenues for 
informing the public and inciting them into discussions 
through an intelligent and participative critical use of the 
media itself. In the present time the use of the internet is 
perceived by Honneth as something that could advance the 
emancipative project if it will be subjected to a cooperative 
evaluation. This is what Honneth suggests in the essay that a 
critical scrutiny of the use of internet may be taken when 
students work together in identifying and examining the 
sources and content of data mined from the internet. In his 
renewal of socialism Honneth has earlier identified that the 
cooperative approach allows for a more efficient and wider 
articulation of pathologies. In the essay this suggestion by 
Honneth of a collective articulation of pathologies is given as 
one concrete way to set the conditions in which pupils could 
participate more fully in the democratic public sphere. Or in 
other words participation itself is the method in which 
citizenship in the public sphere is guaranteed. 
 In an even earlier interview with Anders Petersen and 
Rasmus Willig, Honneth already emphasized the cooperative 
approach as a consciousness raising empirical technique in 
sociological research. He stresses the employment of the 
moral grammar of recognition as a means for articulating 
individual and collective experiences of disrespect in the 
family, in the workplace and politics. According to Honneth: 
 
By using the framework of recognition, for example, 
as incentive for group discussions, or in phrasing 
questions in a qualitative interview by using that 
moral language, it has the effect of raising the 
consciousness of people about that whole 
dimension, which is very often simply repressed or 
neglected. In that sense it has a consciousness- 
raising effect which has mainly to do with a simple 
social fact, namely that there is a certain tendency 
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in our society institutionally to ignore the whole 
spectrum of moral experiences, which are 
somewhat neglected or even repressed in the public 
language. I think, in raising questions and 
stimulating answers by thematic incentives using 
that moral language, we can, indirectly, make 
people aware of a whole hidden sphere of moral 
reality and of moral experiences which we are not 
aware of in everyday life because there is no public 
language of those moral experiences. The public 
language as such is highly demoralized, and 
empirical research using a certain moral vocabulary 
encourages the recovery of the specific language 
necessary for articulating moral experiences. In that 
sense it has a certain effect.90  
 
Group discussions guided by questions that enable the 
experiences of disrespect to surface out may also be coupled 
with biographical accounts. The use of biographical narratives 
as a way to articulate pathologies is a fruitful course taken by 
a number of researchers like Fredrik Sandberg and Chris 
Kubiak91 in the area of “experienced based learning” in the 
workplace, home, community and education; Ted Fleming92 
on adult education; and Rauno Huttunen and Hannu L.T. 
Heikkinen93 on teachers’ profession. The employment of the 
moral grammar of recognition has also been attached to the 
experience of empowerment in the personal, the 
interpersonal or collective and the political or social by 
Manuel Gonçalves Barbosa and Angel Garcia del Dujo94 in the 
promotion of citizenship rights. 
                                                 
90 Petersen and Willig, “An Interview with Axel Honneth The Role of 
Sociology in the Theory of Recognition,” 269. 
91 Sandberg and Kubiak, “Recognition of Prior Learning, Self-realisation 
and Identity within Axel Honneth’s Theory of Recognition.” 
92 Fleming, “Reclaiming the Emancipatory Potential of Adult Education: 
Honneth’s Critical theory and the Struggle for Recognition.”  
93 Huttunen and Heikkinen “Teaching and the Dialectic of Recognition.”  
94 Barbosa and Del Dujo’s “Education and Struggles for Recognition: the 
Strategic Role of Empowerment.” 
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 Another practice that Honneth employs in his 
research and works is the employment of literary works, 
specifically novels, in his description and diagnoses of social 
reality as it also contains a consciousness raising effect when 
it make use of the moral vocabulary.95 Novels or artworks in 
the broad sense are “phenomenological testimonies of certain 
structures of everyday life.”96 Novels, Honneth relates, 
provide empirical basis for his writing which he can’t get from 
sociology when the research is too quantitative and not 
sensitive enough to the nuances in everyday life.97 
Appropriating this to critical pedagogy, this would be an 
instance of an “interdisciplinarization” of teaching and 
research. This allows for a widening of horizons of 
understanding social reality and of identifying, articulating 
and examining pathologies that need to be addressed.  
In the practice of sociology, Honneth admonishes that 
it need not be constrained to a single or fixed method such as 
group discussions or interviews instead, it should “find clever 
ways of combining existing methods (italics mine).”98 Carried 
over to critical pedagogy once more, this means no less than 
an invitation to be creative enough in the craft of teaching and 
research with normative content. Following this thread, R.T. 
Pada’s Reconstructive Normative Simulation (RNS) can most 
potently be employed in critical pedagogy on top of his hopes 
for its future applications in the empirical sciences, political 
philosophy and literature. RNS is a creative translation of 
actual experiences of disrespect and social pathologies into a 
fictitious narrative that shows the intertwined relation of the 
three spheres of recognition. Pada describes it as a “thought 
experiment” in articulating deficits in normative resources 
and tracing how one may cope with it.  “By merging these sets 
                                                 
95 Petersen and Willig, “An Interview with Axel Honneth The Role of 
Sociology in the Theory of Recognition,” 270. 
96 Marcelo, “Recognition and Critical Theory Today: An Interview with 
Axel Honneth,” 215. 
97 Ibid.  
98 Petersen and Willig, “An Interview with Axel Honneth The Role of 
Sociology in the Theory of Recognition,” 268. 
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of spheres, we can demonstrate the necessity of cooperation 
within the spheres and, at the same time, provide adequate 
theoretical perspective in understanding the normative 
claims of individuals through recognition.”99 Pada cautions 
however not to reduce the function of RNS into an evaluative 
tool for social pathologies due to its tendency to be a rigid and 
objectifying normative criteria. As a narrative, especially as a 
fictitious one, it could only reveal certain facets of a more 
complex actual experience. But the consciousness-raising 
articulation of struggles and the diagnostic potential of RNS is 
a promising path in identifying solutions and harnessing the 
energy for collective praxis. A method that through creative 
appropriation into teaching and research is very much in 
consonance with the aforementioned critical pedagogy. 
 In line with Honneth’s description of renewed 
socialism as a global project within multiculturalist 
geographical settings, another pathway that is consistent and 
fulfills the criteria of critical pedagogy is the combined 
approach of the utility of native languages and the critical 
engagement with immanent issues on the various spheres of 
freedom within the immediate local social reality. By 
empowering and harnessing the semantic capacity of native 
languages to voice out the collective experience of disrespect 
and oppression, it could spark a collective praxis for social 
change which is sensitive to its culturally unique resources. It 
must be noted however that the use of native languages is not 
a new initiative and is already at work in academic 
institutions. The engagement of studies with concrete social 
issues has also been showcased many times in different 
works.  
In his “The Methodological Problems of Filipino 
Philosophy,100 Pada cited the weakness of trying to construct 
a single encompassing identity for a Filipino philosophy in 
view of the diversified and uniquely situated cultures in the 
                                                 
99 Pada, Axel Honneth's Social Philosophy of Recognition: Freedom, 
Normativity, and Identity, 192. 
100 Roland Theuas Pada, “The Methodological Problems of Filipino 
Philosophy” in Kritike 8:1 (June 2014) 24-44. 
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Philippines. He also pointed out the deficit of some pioneers 
in the field for a more empirical immersion and engagements 
with the uniquely situated concrete social issues. Then, he 
mentions Feorillo Demeterio and Florentino Hornedo to be 
exemplars of the kind of a critical Filipino philosophy that 
satisfy its requirements. Hornedo is a seasoned 
multidisciplinary researcher whose works encompass the 
disciplines of philosophy, sociology, literature and 
anthropology. He is also recognized in his contributions to 
diverse discussions on concrete social, cultural and political 
issues from his own native Ilokano roots and beyond. 
Demeterio on the other hand has performed the extra mile in 
writing academic and scholarly works in Filipino either on 
theoretical expositions or thematic discussion on certain 
issues. But it should be recognized however that other authors 
have exhibited similar ingredients of this aforementioned 
critical pedagogy though not necessarily using the perspective 
laid out herein from Honneth: Franz Guissepe Cortez for 
example appraises the critical dimension of Roque Ferriols’ 
works in the light of Paulo Freire’s critical pedagogy, Ferriols’ 
“linguistic turn” to Filipino in philosophizing, he says, may be 
interpreted as a “political act” in the sense of critique and 
problematization of colonial discourse and elitist mentality101; 
Ranilo Hermida’s analysis of Philippine democracy via 
Habermas critical theory exemplifies a thematization of a 
specific institution of social freedom;102 Agustin Rodriguez’s 
engagement with socio-political realities as well as the 
enunciation of discourse  in Filipino language is exemplary in 
his two works103; Similar characteristics could also be traced 
                                                 
101 Franz Giuseppe F. Cortez, “The Linguistic turn as a Political Act: 
another Look at the thoughts of Roque Ferriols” in Kritike 8:1 (June 2014), 45-
47. 
102 Ranilo Balaguer Hermida, Imagining Modern Democracy A 
Habermasian Assesment of the Philippine Experiment, (Albany: State University 
of New York, 2014). 
103 See his Governing the Other: Exploring the discourse of Democracy in 
a Multiverse of Reason (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2009) 
and May Laro ang Diskurso ng Katarungan (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila 
Press, 2014). 
Axel Honneth’s Critical Pedagogy…     135 
 
from the initiatives of Wilmer Joseph Tria104 who is the first to 
use a Bikol language in doing and teaching philosophy and 
Adrian Remodo105 who did a socio-political critique of 
oligarchic politics signified in the Bikol language; Jeffrey 
Ocay’s research on the philosophy of work of a local 
community in Negros Occidental and his critical appraisal of it 
as a form of resistance from the destructive tendency of 
globalization and  at the same time as an alternative to social 
development is obviously an example of recognition of silent 
voices in the margins106; to end this partial list is Renante 
Pilapil’s eloquent articulation and critical analysis of the Moro 
struggle in Mindanao through the recent discourses on the 
theory of recognition.107   
Yet, although critical pedagogy has been normatively 
located in the finality of democratic education, Honneth 
acknowledges that it still does not have a clear-eyed view of 
what the content of education would be in the face of 
multiculturalism wherein the struggle for recognition 
perpetually occurs. Hence experimentalism remains another 
pathway that should be attributed to critical pedagogy rather 
than just thinking of education as something that can be 
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This paper has shown that Honneth’s critical theory 
and his view of education could be arranged into a “critical 
pedagogy with normative content.” In this manner, Honneth’s 
claims in his theory of recognition are harmonized with his 
latter philosophical views on social freedom.  The moral-
practical dimension of education was articulated in its being 
situated within the ontological base of recognition. Then, the 
notion of social freedom and its consummation in his renewal 
of socialism was then established as the normative goal of 
pedagogy dubbed as critical with its three-fold characteristics 
of consciousness-raising articulation of struggles, diagnostic-
therapeutic critique and freedom oriented praxis. Honneth’s 
suggestion of the re-coupling of pedagogy and democracy 
directly reinforces that education must be reoriented to the 
ideal of a democratic ethical life and renewed socialism. While 
Honneth has not yet elaborated on the details how a critical 
pedagogy could be carried out through democratic education, 
practical ways were traced and surveyed how to carry out its 
normative goals based on Honneth’s own testimonies and 
practices, as well as from other current practices of social 
critique that resemble the emancipative project of critical 
pedagogy though not explicitly utilizing Honneth’s 
framework. These “pathways” are not taken as final and 
exhaustive for as Honneth himself states, democratic 
education within multiculturalists setting is still a work in 
progress. Perhaps the next task to do, as part of the mentioned 
method of “experimentalism” is the cooperative undertaking 
of applying those general pathways of critical pedagogy 
within the unique and diverse environments of different 
educational institutions. But this would be a problem for 
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